It didn't have to be like this

The USWNT’s hope of a never-been-done-before threepeat of World Cup trophies ended in harsh fashion, in a penalty shootout, via a blocked shot that spun a millimeter across the line. However, when analyzing the totality of Vlatko Andonovski’s tenure, if this is its end, the talent and determination of the players are the only reason it was kind enough to be viewed as the fault of a millimeter, rather than of years.

Andonovski was brought in to guide a talent transition while modernizing the team’s style of play. While an annoying amount of injuries have prevented the team from being at (or even near) full strength, they’re still wildly talented, and, more crucially, much too talented to ever play as poorly as they often did under Andonovski.

Ever since his first international tournament, dubbed the ‘rose gold Olympics’ to save face, signs were there that the job was too big for Andonovski. Even if ‘too big’ is too harsh, his approach never seemed a good fit, and crucially, rarely showed the performances one would expect from a collection of the best talent in the world.

There were multiple reasons, and all were consistent throughout his tenure.

Andonovski’s approach

Vlatko never seemed to have a set plan for the talent at his disposal. The kindest read is that he was attempting to craft reactionary gameplans, rather than instilling an identity. But when the player pool is a gift of some of the best talent in world football, it borders on malpractice to not force opponents to bend to them.

The more cynical read is that his tactics and in-game management lagged behind competent – even sometimes incompetent – managers across the international landscape of women’s football. With the way Japan are playing, it’s perhaps a mercy Andonovski won’t have to match wits with Futoshi Ikeda.

From squad building to tactics to in-game management, he never appeared to be guiding the team toward cohesion, and performances often reflected this erratic decision making. Instead, and for reasons that remain unclear, he simply did not believe in the concept of a box-to-box midfielder (#8). Instead, he flooded players forward without much of a plan beyond ‘well we outnumber them somewhere I guess’.

Not only did this tactic lead to predictably poor performances due to a non-existent midfield, it also setup players to suffer as a result. For years Andi Sullivan became a pariah for seemingly not being able to fill Julie Ertz’s boots. However, not even Ertz was left the entire width of the pitch to defend in quick transition, as Sam Mewis was often sharing defensive duties in the middle of the park and performing the ball retention and progression duties of a true midfield 8.

Instead, Andonovski routinely left Sullivan alone by sending Lindsey Horan forward to join the attack early in sequences, and as frequently as possible. Horan would sometimes stand in the box or on the left wing, and when the ball would turn over, a stream of opposition players would funnel their way toward Sullivan.

This was a constant pitfall of Andonovski’s own making, yet he rarely accepted responsibility or changed tactics. Instead, he wasted time trying Horan, Kristie Mewis and Taylor Kornieck at defensive midfield, to the same results. When he finally relented on his preferred tactic, it was halftime of a match to avoid a history making fourth straight loss in a row.

And still heading into the World Cup, he only reverted back to this tactic when he was once again attempting to avoid embarrassment latest, this time against Sweden in the Round of 16.

Squad building

Players were routinely let down by poor tactics, but also a poor utilization of personnel. Some found it easy to get and stay on Andonovski’s selected rosters, while others were given odd tasks (Christen Press being told she’s in direct competition with Sophia Smith, Mallory Swanson, Trinity Rodman, Alex Morgan and Ashley Hatch, a collection of players who play three separate positions, and all somewhat differently), others were ignored despite stellar league performances (Mia Fishel, who recently signed for Chelsea).

At the Olympics, his decision to bring neither Sophia Smith or Andi Sullivan served as concerning omens. Then, in the tournament, he inexplicably played Catarina Macario a total of seven minutes. In the season that followed that Olympics, Macario led Lyon in goals and scored in their incredible defeat of Barcelona in the UWCL Final.

After the Olympics the hope was that the true transition would begin. But players like Sam Coffey, Savannah DeMelo and Jaelin Howell continued to either be ignored or only exist in some sort of national team purgatory. Each being called up, rarely or never played, then never called up again.

Then, and suddenly, this pattern was completely reversed weeks before the World Cup. Savannah DeMelo, who’d been called up then discarded, never even earning a debut in her short stints with the team, was fast-tracked into the squad at breakneck speed. She was given her a first ever cap in the USWNT’s sendoff game against Wales, then started the first two World Cup matches.

While it was great to finally recognize consistent, high quality performances from a young player, throwing her into starting XIs gave her no time to adjust to the team, and the team no time to adjust to her. But this kind of thing was not unfamiliar under Andonovski. It never paid dividends, and often hurt the team.

There was the time when Carson Pickett, who should have been selected on merit, was summoned across the Atlantic after Emily Fox was injured versus England. She was then immediately thrown into the XI to play an hour against Spain, while Mace swapped to the right. The USWNT put in a confused performance and lost 2-0 to a Spain side without many top players, who were (some still are) in the midst of a battle against manager Jorge Vilda and their federation.

More poor decision making showed up for this World Cup. Previously nailed on backups to Alex Morgan and Rose Lavelle, Ashley Hatch and Ashley Sanchez, were stunned by separate and equally confusing decisions. After making camps for over a year, Hatch wasn’t called up at all, and Sanchez was given zero minutes despite the USWNT needing a goal in three of their four matches, and Lavelle only starting once.

Vlatko’s indecision even extended to the way he mismanaged subs, wildly swinging from one extreme to the other. Early in his tenure, he would often deploy ‘hockey line change’ substitutions (subbing out an entire unit at once) claiming to want to keep familiar units together. In the World Cup, he was ultra hesitant to use even one sub, claiming they’d take a minute or two to get into the game and disrupt the flow. What.

In Sanchez’s case, this was additionally harsh, as the team was more familiar with her at attacking midfield than anyone else who was available against Sweden, yet she never saw the pitch.

Blame rolls uphill

None of this is hindsight, it was all available to be analyzed and critiqued in the moment. Periods between World Cups are cycles, and finding a way to build something is important. Japan’s senior team struggled to find success despite impressing at youth levels. They lost two of three games in the 2023 SheBelieves Cup, but new coach Futoshi Ikeda’s familiarity with Japan’s young stars showed they were building something special.

Colombia, fellow quarterfinalists with Japan, faced the USWNT in two friendlies in June of 2022, losing by a combined score of 5-0. They tried two distinct formations and shuffled players, including bringing Linda Caicedo off the bench twice. By the end of July they found themselves in the Copa América Femenina Final against Brazil, only losing 1-0 to a 39th minute penalty despite generating more shots and more shots on target. Their lineup in that match was nearly identical, bar two players, to who the team that beat Germany at the World Cup.

Under Andonovski, these moments of identifiable growth didn’t exist. There was never a moment in which anyone could point at the development of a cohesive style of play that suited the talent available. Yet, U.S. Soccer and USWNT General Manager Kate Markgraf refused to do anything about it. Making a move mid-cycle might have seemed bold, but enough signs were there to do so; and also, that’s the job.

The saddest part about it all is that the players don’t deserve this. Firstly because individually and collectively, they’re too talented to have been allowed to be led this far astray. But also because a lot of these players are uniquely dominant and endlessly fun to watch.

This team should be fun and overwhelming, or at the very least competent and dangerous. That Andonovski lowered their ceiling below even the lowest expectations is beyond frustrating, and should trigger a complete reevaluation of processes that allowed this predictable outcome to become reality.

Now, Andonovski’s tenure, as well as Markgraf’s, have made history, but the wrong kind. Despite the talent available throughout the country, they assembled and mismanaged a collection of nineteen players (refusing to give minutes to four) to the earliest exit in a World Cup for a USWNT.

So while players post sorrowful Instagram captions aching from an early and cruel World Cup exit, the more intense introspection should be happening above.

–André Carlisle